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Strikes and Lockouts in Germany and Under 
Federal Legislation in the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis 
David Westfall * & Gregor Thusing ** 
INTRODUCTION 
An observer from another planet looking at German and American 
labor law could not fail to be impressed by the sharp dichotomy in the 
treatment of strikes and lockouts in each legal system and, perhaps, to 
wonder whether either system would be improved if it borrowed from 
the other. Of course, what would constitute an improvement depends 
upon the purposes the system serves and the interests that it is in-
tended to protect. In both countries, it is a truism that strikes-and, 
even more importantly, the threat of strikes-playa mcyor role in 
supporting the demands of employees and insuring that what occurs 
when unions negotiate with employers is indeed collective bargaining, 
not "collective begging."l A major challenge is to permit strikes and 
lockouts to play their role without becoming overly burdensome for 
some or all of the interested parties-employees, employers, and the 
public. Thus, regulations that limit such burdens without making these 
rights meaningless may serve an important public purpose. 
A. Possible Uses of Comparative Analysis 
Even the most tentative conclusions derived from any attempt at 
comparative analysis must be qualified by the recognition that there is 
often a vast gulf between any part of a legal system as it appears in 
published sources and its operation in the real world. A less obvious 
qualification is that this difference is highly dependent on the national 
* John L. Gray Professor of Law & Carl F. Schipper, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
A.B. 1947, University of Missouri; LL.B. 1950, Harvard Law School. 
** Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, University of Cologne, Institute for Labor and Commercial 
Law. Dr. iur. 1995, University of Cologne; LL.M. 1998, Harvard Law School. 
1 See Samuel Estreicher, CoUective Bargaining or "CoUective Begging"7: Reflectiuns on Antistrike-
breaker Legislation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 577, 599 (1994). 
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culture and value system.2 For example, the real-world application of 
German labor law seems to be affected by two traits that are so widely 
shared as to constitute part of the national character: a high degree of 
respect for both public3 and private institutions,4 and consistent obe-
dience to legal rules, both on a level often lacking in the United States. 
Additionally, German law is, in a variety of ways, far more protec-
tive of workers than American law. Prominent examples of this height-
ened protection include legislatively mandated vacations of as much 
as four weeks,5 paid sick6 and maternity leave,7 and enhanced protec-
tion against discharge.8 In contrast, American federal law does not 
mandate vacations for private sector employees, and the recently en-
acted Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 requires only unpaid 
leave.9 Moreover, the higher percentage of union membership in Ger-
many, JO coupled with the practice of extending collective bargaining 
2 See Peter L. Murray, Note, A Comparative Law Experiment, 8 IND. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 233 
(1998), for a comparative analysis of German and American law. 
3 For example, Robert B. Reich, the former Secretary of Labor, recently sharply criticized 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan, asserting that he "may be wise, but he's 
not always right." See Robert B. Reich, Talking Back to Greenspan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at 
A27. It is impossible to find comparable public criticism of officials of the Bundesbank. 
4 For example, despite an additional tax of approximately 10% of the regular income tax 
imposed on church members, and the anti-clerical tradition of the former East German govern-
ment, about 70% of the adult German population belong to a church. See Joseph Listl, 56 JURIST 
905 (1996). 
5 Under the Bundesurlaubsgesetz (Federal Paid Leave Act), as of 1995, all employees are entitled 
to paid recreational leave of 20 working days per year (assuming a five-day work week). See 
Bundesurlaubgesetz, v. 1963 (BGB!.I S.2); see also GUNTER HALBACH ET AL., LABOUR LAw IN 
GERMANY: AN OVERVIEW 141-42 (5th ed. 1994). This statutory minimum is exceeded in the great 
majority of collective agreements. In 1993, 70% of employees covered by a collective agreement 
were granted six weeks' paid leave. See id. at 142. 
6 Under the EntgeltJortzahlungsgesetz (Continuation of Payment Act) Art. 4, § 1, employees are 
entitled to as much as six weeks of full wages during each case of illness. See Entgelfortzahlungsge-
setz, v. 1998 (BGB!. I S.3843). 
7 The Mutterschajtsschutzgesetz (Maternity Protection Act), §§ 3, 6, provides paid maternity leave 
of a minimum of fourteen weeks-six before the estimated date of birth and eight weeks after 
(twelve weeks when there are twins or other multiple births). See Mutterschaftsschutzgesetz, v. 
1997 (BGB!. I S.22.93). 
8 In an establishment with more than ten employees, after six months' employment a worker 
can only be dismissed because of his behavior, his incapacity to fulfill his contractual duties, or 
because of business necessity. See Kiindigungsschutzgesetz, § 1 v. 1969 (BGB!. I S.1317) (Protec-
tion Against Dismissal Act). For a discussion of the general protection against dismissal, see 
HALBACH ET AL., supra note 5, at 176-80. 
9 See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U .S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1998). 
10 Private sector union membership is about 30% in Germany, see GREGOR THUSING, DER 
AUSSENSEITER 1M ARBEITSRECHT 17 (1996), compared to 10.2% in the United States. See U.S. 
DEPT. OF LAB., EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 213 (1997) (reporting on employed private nonag-
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agreements to bind other employers in the same industry whose em-
ployees are not represented by a union,ll surely tends to enhance 
unions' bargaining clout by diminishing the importance of competi-
tion from nonunion firms. Thus, the magnitude of the differences just 
described may mean that the fruits of comparative analysis are unlikely 
to include anything approaching a conclusive demonstration of the 
likely consequences of adopting a particular feature of another system. 
Moreover, real world uses of the comparative analysis undertaken 
here are currently limited by what appears to be a high degree of 
improbability that either German or American law governing strikes 
and lockouts will be legislatively revised in any fundamental way in the 
near future. The possibility is at least theoretically greater that German 
law will be revised by judicial decision, because both the right to strikeI2 
and the right to lock out,I3 as well as limitations on those rights, were 
derived by judicial interpretation of the freedom of association guar-
anteed by the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). Accordingly, expan-
sions or contractions of the right could come from the same interpre-
tative source. In contrast, in the United States, federal courts have not 
found any such constitutional protection of the right to strike;14 in-
deed, the ability to strike is expressly denied by statute to all federal 
employees,I5 and, either by statute or decision, to many state employees 
as well. I6 However, judicial and administrative interpretation is often 
used to define the parameters of the statutory provisions on the sub-
ricultural wage and salary workers). One commentator predicts that the figure will fall by 5% by 
the year 2000. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 10-33 (1993). 
II Under Art. 5, § 1 of the Tarifoertragsgesetz (Collective Agreement Act), "[i]f so requested by 
a party to a collective agreement, the Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs ... may declare 
the agreement to be generally binding ... ." Tarifvertragsgestz, v. 1969 (8GBI. I. S.1323). The 
effect of such a declaration, under sec. 4, is to cause the rules of law contained in the agreement 
to apply "within its sphere of application "(that means all employees within the tariff district) "to 
employers and employees not previously bound by the agreement." Id. At the end of 1993,566 
. collective agreements, out of a total of 35,000, had been thus made generally binding, so that 
about 90% of the German work force is now covered by collective agreements, either by normative 
effect of the agreement or by reference in the employment contracts. See HALBACH ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 311, 316. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 68--72. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 190-94. 
14 See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) (rejecting the argument that the "liberty" 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to strike). 
15 See, e.g., United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C. 1971), affd 
mem, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) (upholding a blanket statutory ban on strikes by federal employees); 
see also infra note 31. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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ject, again creating the possibility of revised interpretations of Ameri-
can labor law from these sources. 
Despite the factors just cited, a comparison of the two legal systems 
can be useful, since there have been significant instances where the 
law of one country influenced that of the other. For example, German 
law has played a major role in the development of American decisional 
law regarding the reliance interest in contracts.17 French law similarly 
influenced the English common law in one of the most famous con-
tract cases, Hadley v. Baxendale,18 which addressed the role of foresee-
ability in damages actions.19 More recently, both the European Court 
of Justice and the German Federal Labor Court have adopted, in the 
context of gender discrimination, the American recognition of dispa-
rate impact as a basis for finding racial discrimination in employment.2o 
Moreover, the uses of comparativism in labor law need not be limited 
to guiding or assisting social change at home, but can also provide 
better insight into one's own national system, forecasting future devel-
opments, and serving as an instrument in the formulation and appli-
cation of international labor standards.21 
B. Allocation of Legislative Jurisdiction over Labor Relations 
It is no surprise that legislative jurisdiction over labor relations is 
allocated very differently in Germany and the United States, and that 
those differences have had a major influence on the development of 
the law. The federal law grants the federal legislators jurisdiction over 
collective bargaining, even that which concerns state or municipal 
employees.22 Thus, German law governing strikes provides substantially 
uniform treatment for all employees, with the exception of the two 
groups that are denied the right to strike under any circumstances: 
civil servants (Beamte) and church employees.2!l Civil servants are not 
allowed to strike because they are viewed not as employees, but as 
bound by a special relationship of loyalty to the state. Pressuring the 
17 See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE 
LJ. 52, 55-56 nA, 57 n.8 & 86-87 n.54 (1936). 
18 See 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854). 
19 See Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization o/the Law, 4J. LEGAL 
STUD. 249, 257 (1975). 
20 See generaUy GERLIND WISSKIRCHEN, MITl"ELBARE DIKRIMINIERUNG VON FRAUEN 1M ERWERB8-
LEBEN (1994). 
21 See COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAw & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 18-20 (R. Blanpain ed., 1982). 
22 See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution) [GG) art. 74, nr. 11 (F.R.G.). 
23 See HUGO SEITER, STREIKRECHT UND AUSSPERRUNGSRECHT 508 (1975). 
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state to improve their working conditions would be inconsistent with 
that relationship.24 Church employees are not permitted to strike be-
cause the church views them as part of a community, with the common 
aim of promoting the faith. Because of this shared goal, these employ-
ees and the church that employs them are not regarded as opposing 
parties.25 It follows that the employees may not strike, and the church 
may not lock them OUt.26 This understanding binds the civil authorities 
as well because of the constitutional protection of the autonomy of 
churches, precluding legislative recognition of a right to strike or lock 
out.27 
In contrast, American collective bargaining law, including limitations 
on the right to strike, is reflected in both federal and state legislation. 
This article addresses only federal legislation, which includes: 
(1) The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),28 which governs 
private sector unions and employees, with important exceptions de-
rived either from explicit statutory language or judicial or administra-
tive interpretation; 
(2) The Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),29 covering railroad and airline 
employees; 
(3) Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,30 applying to 
federal employees, none of whom may legally strike.31 
Unlike the German states, American states have legislative jurisdic-
tion over labor relations, limited only by the preemptive effect of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.32 The precise 
contours of such preemption, which in the present context has the 
effect of invalidating state legislation and judicial decisions that are 
found to be inconsistent with the Congressional design reflected in the 
24 See id. 
25 See Gregor Thiising, Die Kirchen als Tarifvertragsparteien, 41 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR EVANGELI-
SCHES KiRCHENRECHT 52 (1996). 
26 See id. 
27 See GG, supra note 22, art. 140 (referring to former Art. 137 of the Weimarer Reichsverfas-
sung). See also Thiising, supra note 25, at 52. 
28 See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1998). 
29 See Railway Labor Act (RLA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1998). 
30 See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1998). 
31 See id. § 7311(3) (1998). See also 5 U.S.C. § 3333 (1998) (requiring all federal employees to 
execute an appointment affidavit under oath, which includes a promise not to participate in a 
strike against the Government of the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1998) (making violation 
of § 7311 a crime). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land .... " 
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NLRA and RLA, is one of the most heavily litigated areas of American 
labor law and is outside the scope of this article.33 As state and munici-
pal employees are expressly excepted from coverage by the NLRA,34 
state constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions govern collective 
bargaining by such employees. More often than not, these employees 
are denied the right to strike,35 although there are wide variations 
among the states and even with respect to different categories of 
employees within a single state.36 
State legislation thus often deals with collective bargaining by em-
ployees in the private sector who are either explicitly excluded from 
coverage by the NLRA, as in the case of agricultural laborers, 37 or over 
whom the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") has declined to 
assert jurisdiction because it has determined that labor disputes of 
those employees do not sufficiently substantially affect interstate com-
merce to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.38 Thus, several states 
33 See LAURENCE H. 'TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 6-25 to 6-33 (2d ed. 1988) for 
a general discussion of preemption. For a discussion of its application in the context of federal 
labor laws, see 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1654-1728 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992). 
34 See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
35 See Richard Kirschner, Labar-Management Relations in the Public Sectur: An Introductury 
Overview of Organizing Activities, Bargaining Units, Scope of Bargaining, and Dispute Resolution 
Techniques, SC29 A.L.I.-A.BA. 229 (1997). The author identifies 13 states, including California 
(by court decision), Illinois, and Pennsylvania that recognize a conditional right to strike for 
certain public employees. At least 38 states have not enacted strike laws. See id. at 246 (citing 
DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 10 (4th ed. 
1993». The most stringent anti-strike legislation is New York's Taylor Law, officially known as the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, N.Y. CIV. SERVo LAw, Ch. 7, Art. 14, §§ 200-214 (McKin-
ney 1997). Section 210 of the statute prohibits strikes, and subsection 2(f) provides what is often 
referred to as a "two for one" penalty on striking employees, requiring deduction of two days' 
pay for each day on strike. See id. However, since one day's pay is lost because the employee was 
not working, it might be more accurately described as "one for one." Other penalties include 
suspension of the dues check-off for the striking union. See id. § 210(3) (a). For a discussion of 
the Act, see RONALD DONOVAN, ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAw: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
IN NEW YORK (1990). 
36 For example, Pennsylvania prohibits strikes by some categories of employees, see PA. STAT. 
ANN., tit. 43, § 1101.1001 (West 1998), but allows strikes by other employees unless or until the 
strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. 
See id. § 1101.1003. 
37 SeeNLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1998). 
38 See id. § 164(c)(I), authorizing the NLRB, in its discretion, to decline to assert jurisdiction 
over any labor dispute where the effect on interstate commerce is deemed insufficient to warrant 
the exercise of such jurisdiction, provided that the dispute is not one over which it would have 
exercised jurisdiction under the standards prevailing as of August 1,1959. Since those standards 
are expressed in terms of dollar volume of business done by employers; the effect of inflation 
has been to steadily diminish the number of disputes over which the Board may decline jurisdic-
tion. Section 14(c) (2) authorizes the states to assert jurisdiction over such disputes. 
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have either undertaken to regulate collective bargaining by agricul-
turallaborers,39 have enacted a more general state statute patterned 
on the NLRA,40 or have undertaken to act when the NLRB does not 
exercise jurisdictionY Finally, courts have excluded lay teachers in 
parochial schools from the NLRA's coverage,42 so that the church is 
not required to bargain collectively with them. Accordingly, strikes by 
lay teachers in church-operated schools and other concerted activities 
are not protected by federal law and may lead to discipline or dis-
charge. 
C. Judicial and Administrative Roles in Labor Relations 
In Germany, the Bundesarbeitsgericht, the Federal Labor Court, is the 
final judicial tribunal in labor relations, subject only to review by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal Constitutional Court. The latter 
only has jurisdiction to decide whether the Bundesarbeitsgencht cor-
rectly interpreted the Constitution and cannot review its interpretation 
of other law. However, as both the right to strike and the limitations 
on that right are derived from the freedom of association guaranteed 
by the Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court plays a significant 
role in developing strike law. In fact, in a few cases, the Federal Con-
stitutional Court has reversed the Federal Labor Court.43 
!9 See, e.g., California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (West 1998). 
40 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.12 (West 1998). 
41 For a discussion of state responses to the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction provided by 
NLRA § 164(c) (2), see Joanne K. Guinan, Notice Requirements: Federal Preemption of State and 
LocalPlant Closing Statutes, 13 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 333, 347-50 (1985). Some states require proof 
that the NLRB has declined jurisdiction, and others merely require that the case be one that it 
would not hear under published decisions and guidelines. See id. at 347. Cases sustaining the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a state agency include Jackson County Pub. Hosp. v. Public Emp. ReI. 
Bd., 280 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1979) (state exercised jurisdiction where NLRB, in the exercise of 
discretion, declined to do so); Operation and Maintenance Serv., Inc. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 
539 N .E.2d 1030 (Mass. 1989) (holding that state commission properly asserted jurisdiction after 
NLRB dismissed petition). 
42 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The holding was grounded 
on the Court's desire to avoid resolving the potential conflict between the First Amendment's 
guarantees of religious freedom and Congressional exercise in the NLRA of its powers under the 
commerce clause. The lower federal courts have struggled to determine the degree of church 
involvement required in order for Catholic Bishop to apply. For a discussion, see 2 DEVEWPING 
LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 1572-76. 
43 See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] 88, 103 (holding that the government as employer can temporarily replace striking public 
servants only pursuant to an explicit statute). The court itself is not allowed to invent such a right 
of temporary replacement. 
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In contrast, the United States does not have a specialized labor court. 
The NLRB, an administrative agency which has no German counter-
part, performs many quasi-judicial functions.44 The agency, however, 
does not have the power to enforce its orders and, absent voluntary 
compliance, must seek enforcement from a federal court of appeals. 
Accordingly, federal courts play an active role in labor disputes.45 In 
addition, both federal and state courts have jurisdiction over suits 
against labor unions46 and have a limited role in enjoining some types 
of strikes.47 
Notwithstanding this lack of enforcement powers, the Board, its 
General Counsel, the Regional Directors, and the Administrative Law 
Judges ("ALl") together constitute mcyor sources of administrative and 
quasi-judicial interpretations of the NLRA's definition of "unfair labor 
practices"48 and the NLRB's issuance of "cease and desist" orders49 
to prevent such practices. Since strikes50 and employer responses to 
strikes51 may constitute unfair labor practices, both actions may be 
subject to "cease and desist" orders in certain circumstances. Moreover, 
the General Counsel's decision either to issue or to refuse to issue a 
complaint (or, in the great majority of cases which do not present 
unusual questions, the decision of a Regional Director to whom he has 
delegated his power in the matter) also may have a major impact on 
the parties affected by a dispute.52 Similarly, if a complaint is issued, 
44 The Board determines questions concerning representation of employees under § 9 of the 
NLRA, and seeks to prevent unfair labor practices under § 10. However, it acts only in response 
to charges filed in accordance with § 10(b). See generally EDWARD B. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB (rev. ed. 1980). 
45 See NLRA § 10(e), (j), 29 U.S.C. 160 (e), (j) (1998). 
46 See LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1998), authorizing suits for violation of contracts 
between employers and unions to be brought in federal district courts, and LMRA § 303, 29 
U.S.C. § 187 (1998), extending such jurisdiction to suits for damages by persons injured by 
conduct of unions prohibited by NLRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.§ 158 (1998), which contains a ban 
on secondary boycotts. In Charles Duwd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), the Court held 
that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits under § 301. 
47 See infra text accompanying notes 219--20. 
48 Unfair labor practices ("ULP") of employers are defined in NLRA § 8(a); union ULPs are 
defined in § 8(b). 
49 See NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1998). 
50 See ill. § 8(b) (4),29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1998). 
51 Employer responses to strikes may constitute unfair labor practices under NLRA § 8(a) (1) 
(interference with rights protected by NLRA § (7)), NLRA § (3) (discriInination to encourage 
or discourage union membership), or NLRA § (5) (refusal to bargain). Section 7 protects, inter 
alia, the right of employees to engage in, or refrain from engaging in, concerted activities. 
52 Under NLRA § 3(d), the General Counsel has "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in 
respect of ... issuance of complaints under section 10 ... ." The Supreme Court held, in Vaca 
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the action of the ALJ who either dismisses or sustains the complaint, 
in whole or in part, may have important consequences, even though 
the ALl's action is subject to appeal to the Board itself. 53 
The National Mediation Board ("NMB"), the administrative agency 
that, pursuant to the RLA, has jurisdiction over labor relations in the 
airline and railroad industries,54 lacks even the NLRB's power to deter-
mine what constitutes an "unfair labor practice" or to issue a "cease 
and desist" order to prevent such practices. Instead, the affected parties 
are relegated to seeking injunctive relief in the federal courts.55 How-
ever, the NMB can, by exercising its substantially unlimited discretion-
ary power, hold unions and employers "in mediation" when the two 
parties disagree over proposed changes in the terms of a collective 
agreement, thereby postponing the time when the parties are legally 
permitted to use self-help by calling a strike or unilaterally changing 
terms and conditions of employment.56 
v. Sipes, 386 u.s. 171, 182 (1967), that "the General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse 
to institute an unfair labor practice complaint." 
53For a discussion of the NLRB's review of decisions of administrative law judges, see 2 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 1799-1800. 
54Under § 2, ninth of the Railway Labor Act (RIA), 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1998), the NMB 
resolves disputes as to who shall represent employees. Under § 5, either party may invoke the 
services of the NMB in a dispute concerning changes in pay, rules, or working conditions 
(so-called "major" disputes), or it may proffer its services if it finds a "labor emergency" exists. 
Under § 6, carriers generally may not make changes in such matters after the NMB's services 
have been invoked or proffered until it has finally acted on the controversy. If it determines that 
further mediation will be unsuccessful, § 5, first, requires the NMB to proffer binding arbitration. 
If either or both parties refuse the proffer, the NMB is required to notifY the parties that its 
mediation efforts have failed. Such notice has the effect of releasing the parties from mediation 
and starting a 30-day cooling off period, after which they are free to engage in se1f.help-the 
union by going on strike and the carrier by making changes reasonably required to maintain 
service. See generally THE RAILWAY LABOR AcT 216--17 (Douglas L. Leslie, ed. 1995). 
55 For a discussion of injunctive relief against a carrier that has failed to maintain the status 
quo in a major dispute, see id. at 241-42. For a discussion of similar relief against a union, see 
id. at 250. In these cases, the restrictions on injunctive relief in labor disputes do not apply. See 
id. at 243-45; see also infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
56 For a discussion of the "extraordinarily limited" judicial review of the mediation process, see 
RAILWAY LABOR AcT, supra note 54, at 218-20, discussing Local 808, Bldg. Maintenance Servo & 
RR Workers v. National Mediation Bd., 888 F.2d 1428,1433-37 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that a 
two year period of mediation is not unusual). 
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I. NATURE AND SOURCE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
A. Definition of "Legal Strike" 
The preceding introductory discussion has assumed that the term 
"strike" has a common meaning in both legal systems. In part, it does, 
as both countries require joint action by two or more employees in 
order for a work stoppage to be treated as a legal strike. Some Ameri-
can courts have, however, stretched the definition of a "legal strike" by 
finding that the requisite joint action exists where a single employee 
is deemed to be acting on behalf of his co-workers.57 Aside from the 
common requirement of joint action by two or more employees, the 
term "strike" has a narrower meaning in German law than in American 
law. Unlike German law, American law does not require that a strike 
be called by a union or be for the purpose of obtaining a collective 
agreement in order to be considered a legal strike. This difference 
stems from the different sources of protection of the right to strike in 
the two countries. 
1. Germany 
According to a commonly accepted definition, a legal strike in Ger-
many is the '~ointly and deliberately executed cessation of work by a 
number of employees with the intention that they will resume work 
once they have successfully forced through their demands in the form 
of the conclusion of a new collective agreement. "58 Implicit in the 
definition is that the strike be called by a union, as only a union can 
execute a collective agreement. A partial refusal to perform work, the 
so-called "work-to-rule" or "go-slow," is also a strike, although, as dis-
cussed below, it is an illegal one.59 
2. United States 
Section 501 (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), provides that "the term 
57 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (holding that truck driver's 
refusal to drive a truck with allegedly unsafe brakes based on a provision of a collective bargaining 
agreement was "concerted activity" because the driver was invoking a right rooted in that agree-
ment). 
58 HALBACH ET AL., supra note 5, at 331; see also HANS BROX & BERND RUTHERS, ARBEIT-
SKAMPFRECHT 17 (2d ed. 1982) (for further references). 
59 See infra text accompanying notes 112-14. 
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strike includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by em-
ployees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other con-
certed interruption of operations by employees. ''60 The LMRA 
extensively amended the NLRA but is expressly inapplicable to the 
RLA.61 However, there is no reason to anticipate that the term would 
be construed differently under that act. 
An early NLRB decision stated that "a strike exists when a group of 
employees ceases work in order to secure compliance with a demand 
for higher wages, shorter hours, or other conditions of employment, 
the refusal of which by the employer has given rise to a labor dispute."62 
However, the NLRA's protection of "concerted activities" of employees 
does not depend on the making and refusal of such a demand, and 
extends, for example, to a spontaneous walkout of non-unionized 
employees because they believed it was too cold to work, even though 
they had not made a specific demand to their employer.63 
Whether particular conduct of employees constitutes a strike is not 
always clear, and important consequences may turn on how that ques-
tion is resolved. For example, an employer may permanently replace 
economic strikers,64 but conduct of some employees that falls short of 
the definition of a strike does not afford a legal basis for an employer's 
permanently replacing employees. In Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. 
NLRB, a majority of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 
acts of sabotage amounted to an in-plant strike, triggering the em-
ployer'S right to replace bargaining unit employees permanently. 55 One 
judge dissented on the ground that the employer "could not identifY 
a single worker who participated in the alleged strike and could not 
determine with reasonable definiteness when the strike occurred. "66 
It should be borne in mind that the present discussion deals only 
with strikes and not with picketing as such. Although picketing often 
is carried on in connection with a strike in an attempt to dissuade 
workers, customers, and suppliers from dealing with the struck firm 
and thereby pressure it to agree to the employees' demands, it may 
also be carried on for other purposes, such as persuading the employ-
60 Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (1998). 
filSeeLMRA§ 212, 29 U.S.C. 182 (1998). 
62 See American Mfg. Concern, 7 N .L.R.B. 753, 759 (1938). 
63See NLRBv. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 u.s. 9 (1962). 
64 See infra text accompanying notes 202-04. 
65 See 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977). 
66 [d. at 1135 (Wisdom, CJ., dissenting). 
40 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No. 1 
ees to accept a union as their bargaining representative.67 The regula-
tion of picketing, other than in connection with a strike, is outside the 
scope of this article. 
B. Source of the Right to Strike 
Many of the differences in the application of German and American 
law to strikes follow from the difference in the source of the right to 
strike. While the German right to strike is derived from the Federal 
Constitution, the American right to strike is statute-based. Accordingly, 
the difference in sources gives rise to important differences in strike 
law between the two countries. 
1. Germany 
In Germany, the right of an employee to strike is constitutionally 
protected. Article 9, Section 3 of the Grundgesetz provides: 
The right to form associations to safeguard and improve 
working and economic conditions is guaranteed to everyone 
and to all trades, occupations and professions. 
Agreements which restrict or seek to impair this right shall 
be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be 
illegal. 
Although the wording of section 3 only provides for the right to form 
associations, courts have recognized that such a right would be an 
empty formality if the association could not do anything to serve its 
purpose. Consequently, constitutional protection of the right would be 
senseless. Therefore, in 1954, the Federal Constitutional Court decided 
that the right to form associations enunciated in Article 9, Section 3 
of the Grundgesetz includes protection of certain activities of both 
unions and employers' associations that correspondingly cannot be 
legislatively curtailed without amending the constitution.68 These ac-
tivities include the right to enter into collective agreements, as this is 
the classical purpose of unions. Since such agreements should give 
equal consideration to the interests of both parties, the union must 
have the right to strike so that collective bargaining will not be reduced 
67 See NLRA § 8(b) (7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (restricting organizational and recognitional 
picketing). See also 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, ch. 21 (discussing such restrictions). 
6S See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 1 zu Art. 9 GG (1954) (Federal Constitutional Court). 
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to "collective begging." The right is therefore protected, subject, of 
course, to judicially developed restrictions on its exercise. 
In addition to the protection afforded by the German Constitution, 
some commentators contend that the European Social Charter69 also 
protects the right to strike.70 If this conclusion were correct, it would 
raise interesting issues as to whether the Charter's protection overrides 
the judicially developed exceptions to the protection provided by the 
German Constitution, or whether similar exceptions would be applica-
ble to the Charter as well. However, most commentators believe that 
this international treaty is binding only on governments and does not 
create rights for nongovernmental organizations or individual citi-
zens.71 Moreover, since the right to strike is derived from the constitu-
tionally protected right to form associations, it logically follows that 
only unions, and not individual employees, can exercise that right. 
Thus, employees who participate in a union's strike enjoy the protec-
tion afforded their activities only because of the union's exercise of the 
right, and not because of any right they have as individuals. 72 
Although the Constitution of the Weimar Republic contained lan-
guage almost identical to that of Article 9 Section 3 Basic Law, it was 
generally regarded as lacking similar protection for the activities of 
either employee or employer associations.73 Therefore, although em-
ployees could join together in terminating their contracts in order to 
exert pressure on the employer, if they did so they no longer had their 
jobs. In contrast, when a union today calls a strike, employees who 
participate do not terminate their employment contracts, but merely 
69The Charter, signed October 18, 1961, provides: "With a view to ensuring the effective 
exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Contracting Parties . . . recognise: the right of 
workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interests, including the right 
to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered 
into." EUROPEAN SoCIAL CHARTER, October 18, 1961, part II, art. 6, Europ. T.S. No. 35. 
70 See ROLF BIRK ET AL., GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG KOLLEKTIVER ARBEITSKONFLIKTE 64 (1988); 
HUGO SEITER, STREIKRECHT UND AUSSPERRUNGSRECHT 129 fT (1975) for an explanation of a draft 
of an Industrial Action Act made by a group of German professors. 
71 See THUsING, supra note 10, at 35 fT. with further references; Horst Konzen, 41 jURISTISCHE 
ZEITUNG 157, 162 (1986); GUNTER SCHAUB, ARBEITSRECHT-HANDBUCH 1612 (8th ed. 1996). 
72 Hugo Seiter has vigorously argued the opposite view. See SEITER, supra note 70, passim He 
believed that the Basic Law also grants the single employee the right to strike. However, though 
some commentators agree with his reasoning, see, e.g., RUPERT SCHOLZ, in THEODOR MAUNZ ET 
AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ Art. 9, sec. 192 (1994), it was never adopted by the courts. 
See THUSING, supra note 10, at 31 fT. 
75 See GERHARD ANSCHUTZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES Art. 159 § 5 (14th ed. 
1933); HUGO SINZHEIMER, GRUNDZUGE DES ARBEITSRECHT 86 (2d ed. 1927). 
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suspend their contractual duties (and right to compensation) for the 
duration of the strike.74 
2. United States 
Unlike the German Constitution, the American Constitution does 
not explicitly protect the right to form associations. Thus, constitu-
tional protection of that right has been judicially derived from a variety 
of sources. For example, in some contexts, freedom of association has 
been derived by implication. from the First Amendment's guarantees 
of freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly.75 However, those 
guarantees do not preclude legislative restrictions on picketing, which 
is judicially viewed as "more than free speech. "76 
Without constitutional protection, the right to strike is alternatively 
granted, limited, or even categorically denied by both federal and state 
legislation. In United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount,77 the District 
Court for the District of Columbia upheld a blanket legislative ban on 
strikes by federal employees on the basis of public interest and histori-
cal tradition, even though the court assumed that such employees have 
a constitutionally protected right to form labor organizations. In up-
holding the ban, the court relied on the interest in assuring "the 
continuing functioning of the Government without interruption, to 
protect public health and safety, or for other reasons. "78 The court 
concluded that the ban was neither arbitrary nor irrationally discrimi-
natory, notwithstanding the general statutory protection of strikes by 
employees in the private sector afforded by Section 13 of the NLRA. 
Similarly, a pre-NLRA Supreme Court decision, Dorchy v. Kansas,79 
found that "[n]either the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment confers the absolute right to strike"80 and accordingly upheld a 
state statute making it a crime "to induce others to quit their employ-
74This was recognized in one of the first judgments of the Federal Labor Court. See 1 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [BAGE] [Supreme Labor Court] 291 (1955 FRG). 
75 For a discussion of First Amendment associational rights, see TRIBE, supra note 33, §§ 12-26 
to 12-27. 
76International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) (quoting 
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)) ("Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol 
of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind 
or another, quite irrespective of the ideas which are being disseminated. ") . 
77 See 325 F.Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). 
78 [d. at 883. 
79 See 272 U.S. 306 (1926). 
80 [d. at 311. 
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ment for the purpose and with the intent to hinder, delay, limit or 
suspend the operation of' mining.81 
At least one state supreme court, that of California, has held that 
the statutory prohibition on public employee strikes is arbitrary and 
thus invalid under the state's common law.82 In dicta, the court sug-
gested that the right of all workers to withhold their labor, whether in 
the public sector or the private sector, may be protected by the right 
of association found in both the federal and state constitutions, so that 
it cannot be abridged without a substantial or compelling justifica-
tion.83 As a practical matter, however, state courts generally treat any 
rights of public employees to strike as being wholly a matter for legis-
lative determination, or sometimes a question of the common law of 
the state, rather than presenting a question of constitutional interpre-
tation under either the federal or state constitution. 
C. Effect of a Strike 
Both Germany and the United States treat an employee's participa-
tion in a strike as suspending, but not terminating, the employment 
relationship. In the United States, the duty of the employer and the 
union to engage in collective bargaining continues during a legal 
strike.84 The employer's duty to engage in collective bargaining is 
suspended during an illegal strike or during certain other kinds of 
illegal or unprotected conduct by the union.85 In contrast, German law 
does not impose a duty to bargain collectively at any time, although 
the union is required to present its contract demands before going on 
strike. 
In the United States, after the parties have bargained to impasse, 
thereby fulfilling one of their duties under the NLRA, the employer 
generally may implement earlier proposals without being compelled 
to bargain further.86 A logical exception to the suspension of that duty 
is when the employer wishes to implement a proposal that reserves the 
81 [d. at 307. 
82 See County Sanitation Dist. No.2 of L.A. County v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 699 
P.2d 835 (Cal. 1985). 
83 See id. 
84 See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 434-38 (1976). 
85 See 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 710-11 (Patrick Hardin, ed., 3d ed. 1992). But see GoRMAN, 
supra note 84, at 438 (characterizing cases holding that unprotected strike action by a union 
suspends an employer's duty to bargain as being of "dubious vitality"). 
86 For a discussion of the elements of "impasse," see 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 85, 
at 691-96. 
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employer the right to make merit wage increases in its sole discretion. 
Implementation of such a proposal, like a no-strike clause, is inherently 
destructive of the statutory collective bargaining process and thus falls 
within a narrow exception to the doctrine permitting implementa-
tion of employer offers after impasse.87 Other exceptions include dues 
check-off, union security, and arbitration clauses.88 German law does 
not, however, permit any such implementation of employer proposals 
before agreement has been reached with the union. 
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT 
Before turning to limitations on the right to strike, it is important 
to note that in Germany, strikes can be either "legal" or "illegal," and 
the latter may be enjoined or be the basis for a claim for damages 
against the union calling the strike or against the individual employees 
who participate.89 In contrast, in the United States, strikes and other 
concerted activities of employees may be unprotected without being 
prohibited.90 In such cases, the employer may discipline or discharge 
the employees who participate in the activity without thereby commit-
ting an unfair labor practice, but generally has no right to injunctive 
relief because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,91 which severely limits the 
87 See McClatchy Newspapers v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
88 See id. at 1030. In dicta, the Court of Appeals pointed out that dues checkoff and union 
security clauses are required by NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), to be authorized by a 
collective bargaining agreement, and referred to case authority supporting its conclusion that 
"general principles of contract interpretation under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act" required that arbitration clauses be the result of a voluntary agreement. Id. 
89 See MANFRED L6wISCH ET AL., 260 ARBEITSKAMPF- UND SCHLICHTUNGSRECHT (2d ed. 1997); 
criticized by Franz Gamillscheg, Das deutsche Arbeitsrecht am Ende des Jahrhunderts, 1998 RECHT 
DER ARBEIT 2, 4. 
90 For example, a strike not authorized by the union bargaining representative, where there is 
one, generally is unprotected but not illegal, although some decisions have held such strikes 
protected if the object is to protect the union's demands and policies. For a discussion and case 
authorities, see 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 33, at 1111-12. The best-known example 
of unprotected activity other than a strike is Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 420 u.s. 50 (1975), in which employees who picketed to protest allegedly racially 
discriminatory policies of the employer instead of participating in the grievance arbitration 
procedure provided in the collective agreement, were found to be unprotected by the NLRA. For 
a discussion of the status of partial and intermittent strikes, see infra text accompanying notes 
132-38. 
91 See Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1998). The history of the Act, which reflects 
a deep distrust of judicial intervention in labor disputes that must be puzzling for many German 
readers, is summarized in ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAw 46--51 (12th ed. 1996). Although 
the Act applies only to federal courts, many states have similar acts restricting relief available in 
their courts. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1997). For a discussion of the possible 
1999) STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS 45 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 
Injunctions are not automatically available against even illegal strikes, 
again because of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's restrictions. The employer 
might be able to seek money damages from the employees individually; 
however, in practice, such claims are rarely pursued. Further discussion 
of remedies for illegal strikes will be deferred until Part IV. 
An important difference between German and American law is the 
extent to which strikes in the United States are wholly prohibited 
because the employer is a governmental entity. In Germany, however, 
governmental employees (but not civil servants) generally enjoy the 
right to strike unless the purpose of the strike is illegaP2 Of course, 
neither country permits strikes in the armed services. In addition, 
blanket prohibitions are supplemented by procedural requirements 
and limitations on the scope, timing, frequency, or duration of strikes 
that may cause an otherwise legal strike to be or become illegal. 
A. Relevance of the Object of the Strike 
1. Germany 
The basic requirement is that strikes are legal only if their purpose 
is to achieve a collective agreement. Three major types of strikes are 
typically considered to be illegal: political strikes, strikes to enforce a 
legal claim, and solidarity strikes in most cases. 
a. Political Strikes 
In German law, a strike is political if its purpose is to exert pressure 
on governmental administrators or legislators, as distinguished from a 
strike in support of bargaining demands concerning wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.93 Political strikes have 
figured prominently in twentieth century German history with the 
best-known being the strike that started in Kiel, in northern Germany, 
in 1918, shortly followed by the capitulation of Germany at the end of 
World War I and the abdication of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. In 
contrast, in the "Kapp-Putsch" in 1920, a general strike by all unions 
in opposition to a putsch by nationalistic right-wing radicals led by 
consequences of removal to a federal court of a case in which a state court had granted injunctive 
relief, see 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 1002-03. 
92 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
93 See SCHAUB, supra note 71, at 1609; L6wISCH ET. AL, supra note 89, at 16. 
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World War I Captain Kapp, successfully induced the radicals to aban-
don their effort to overthrow the Weimar Republic. 
In 1952, in a case concerning a strike in the newspaper industry, the 
Federal Labor Court established the illegality of political strikes.94 In 
that case, the union called the strike in order to influence the German 
Parliament (Bundestag) in its consideration oflegislation leading to the 
Workers Constitution Act,95 which provided for and empowered ''works 
councils" of employees to deal with employers concerning certain 
aspects of working conditions. The court held the strike, which lasted 
for only two days, to be illegal. Consequently, the employer who sub-
sequently sued was entitled to damages from both the striking union 
and from the employees who participated in the strike. The court 
relied on the fact that the strike was not for the purpose of achieving 
a collective agreement with the employers, the newspaper companies, 
but rather to put pressure on a legislative body. This result follows 
logically from the origin of the right to strike in the freedom of 
association, which carries with it the right to make collective agree-
ments. 
A recent example of political strikes includes one called in opposi-
tion to proposals to change the law with respect to continuation of 
wages during an employee's illness. A strike for this goal would gener-
ally be regarded as being for an illegal purpose since it is not for the 
purpose of achieving a collective agreement. In the case in question, 
the "strikes" were merely demonstrations made outside working time 
and therefore were not legally "strikes" for the purposes of the labor 
laws. However, some German jurists who support the goals of unions 
contend that strikes for the purpose of influencing legislation concern-
ing working conditions, such as that relating to wage continuation 
during sickness, should be included under the freedom of associa-
tion.96 Additionally, some commentators, invoking the history of the 
Weimar and the Kapp-Putsch strikes, assert that a political strike to 
defend democracy should be legal.97 That conclusion is sound but does 
not rely on the freedom of association accorded by Article 9 Section 3 
of the Grundgesetz, but rather on Article 20, Section 4 which provides 
that "all Germans shall have the right to resist any person or persons 
94 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 1 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (Federal Labor Court). 
95 See Betriebsverfassungsgsesetz, v. 1952 (BGBl.I S.681). 
96 See WOLFGANG DXUBLER ET AL., ARBEITSKAMPFRECHT 165 (2d ed. 1984). 
97 See BROX & RUTHERS, supra note 58, at 58 for further references. 
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seeking to abolish the constitutional order, should no other remedy be 
possible." 
b. Strikes to Enforce a Legal Claim 
Again, because the right to strike is derived from the constitutional 
right to seek a collective agreement, a strike to enforce a legal right, 
such as a claim to overtime or holiday pay either under the terms of a 
collective agreement or under provisions oflaw governing the employ-
ment relationship, is illegal.98 If either a union or an employee wishes 
to assert such a right, they must proceed by filing suit, instead of by 
striking. To allow a strike to enforce such a right would be illogical 
because it would substitute the law of the jungle for the rule of law-
the economically stronger party would prevail, without regard to the 
merits of the claim. 
c. Solidarity Strikes 
A solidarity strike, which by definition is directed against an em-
ployer with whom the union is not seeking a collective agreement but 
rather to support the demands of another union, is illegal, subject to 
two narrow exceptions.99 Thus, ifVnion V is on strike against Employer 
E, the union cannot strike or picket Employer F to put pressure on F 
to withhold purchases of goods and services produced by E or to refuse 
to supply goods and services to E in order to induce E to agree to V's 
bargaining demands. Although the purpose of such a strike or picket-
ing is to help V achieve a collective agreement, Employer F cannot 
grant V's bargaining demands and thus is in the position of an eco-
nomic hostage-something the law does not tolerate. In a leading 
decision that held solidarity strikes to be illegal, the Federal Labor 
Court noted two exceptions to the general rule. First, solidarity strikes 
are not illegal where Employer F has given up its neutrality by taking 
over the production of Employer E and selling to E's customers. Sec-
ond, a solidarity strike is not illegal where the economic relationship 
98 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 58 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1978) (Federal Labor Court); 
LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 76; BROX & RUTHERS, supra note 58, at 79; SEITER, supra note 
70, at 406. 
99 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 85 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1985) (Federal Labor Court); 
Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 90 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1988) (Federal Labor Court); 
LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 102. 
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between E and F is such that they can be regarded as a single enter-
prise. 
Although the Federal Labor Court noted the exceptions just de-
scribed, it has not yet held that the requirements for applying either 
exception were met. With respect to the first exception, many German 
commentators believe it is not supported by the logic of the free 
market, in which it is natural for an enterprise to benefit from a strike 
against a competitor by taking over its production and selling to its 
customers. IOO 
Literally, a solidarity strike would also describe the situation in which 
Union U is on strike against Employer E, and Union X also goes on 
strike against the same Employer E, not in support of its own bargain-
ing demands but rather as an expression of solidarity with and support 
for Union U. In practice, however, the structure of German unions 
makes the situation just described no more than a theoretical possibil-
ity. The norm prescribed by the umbrella organization of unions, the 
Deutscher GewerkschaJtsbund ("DGB"), the German counterpart to the 
AFL-CIO, is one union per plant, so that two unions would co-exist at 
the same plant only if one, such as that representing white collar 
workers, the Deutsche AngesteUtenperkschaft ("DAG"), was not part of 
the organization named. 10l In that situation, however, rather than strik-
ing in support of Union U, Union X would join with Union U in 
negotiations seeking a collective agreement covering members of both 
unions. As there is no major non-DGB blue collar union, there is 
almost always only one such union in a plant. 
2. United States 
Unlike German law, American law does not require that strikes, in 
order to be legal, be for the purpose of achieving a collective agree-
ment. Apart from strikes that are prohibited by such an agreement, if 
a given strike is illegal it usually is either because the required pre-strike 
procedures, described at part C below, were not followed, or for one 
of three reasons: 
100 See Manfred Lieb, 1986 SAMMLUNG ARBEITSRECHTLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 64, 65; THus-
lNG, supra note 10, at 163. 
101 It should be noticed that according to a resolution in 1997 the DAG will join the DGB in 
the next years and will merge with the Gewerltschaft for Offentliche Dien.ste Transport und Verlcehr 
("OW"), which is a DGB-union and represents the public employees and several other unions. 
See DIE WELT, July 14,1998, at 3. 
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(1) The strike is by government employees, many of whom are 
denied the right to strike; 
(2) An object of the strike is prohibited by section 8(b) (4) of the 
NLRA, and the union represents employees who are subject to the Act; 
(3) The strike is over an arbitrable dispute, and therefore, generally 
is illegal under the RIA, and often under the NLRA as well. In addi-
tion, both the NLRA and the RIA provide for the President's invoca-
tion of emergency powers to defer strikes. A strike during such a period 
of deferral is illegal. 
Before turning to an analysis of the sources of illegality just de-
scribed, it is appropriate to note that some kinds of strikes that are 
illegal in Germany are legal in the United States because of section 7 
of the NLRA, which generally protects concerted activities by employ-
ees and of section 13, which protects the right to strike "except as 
specifically provided for herein." 
a. Political Strikes 
Political strikes have not played as important a role in American 
history as they have played in Germany. Indeed, the best-known exam-
ple of what might be regarded as a political strike was directed at a 
foreign government, rather than at domestic officials or groupS.102 M-
ter the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan on January 9, 1980, the Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") announced that its mem-
bers would not handle any cargo going to or coming from the former 
Soviet Union or carried on Russian ships.103 A collective agreement 
between an ILA local and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. ('JBT") 
contained a broad no-strike clause banning "any strike of any kind."l04 
When the local refused to load ships destined for the former Soviet 
Union, JBT sued for, inter alia, damages and injunctive relief.105 The 
Supreme Court rejected JBT's argument that the political motivation 
of the union took its refusal to load the ships out of the general ban 
on injunctions in labor disputes contained in section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.106 In a later action by a third party for damages it had 
incurred as a result of the union's refusal, the Court held the union's 
102 See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 457 U.S. 702 
(1982). 
103 See ill. at 704-05. 
104 See id. at 706 n A. 
105 See id. at 706. 
106 See id. at 715-20. 
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action to be a prohibited secondary boycott under section 8(b)(4) of 
the NLRA.107 
b. Strikes to Enforce a Legal Claim 
Again, the protection of concerted activities of employees, coupled 
with the absence of any requirement that a strike be for the purpose 
of obtaining a collective agreement, leads to the conclusion that strikes 
to enforce a legal claim are not illegal in the United States. However, 
closely analogous doctrines, discussed below,108 permit employers that 
are subject to the NLRA to seek injunctions against strikes over dis-
putes over matters subject to arbitration under the terms of a collective 
agreement. These doctrines also permit employers subject to the RLA 
to seek similar injunctive relief against strikes over so-called "minor" 
disputes-those relating to interpretation of collective agreements-as 
distinguished from disputes over proposals to change the terms of such 
agreements. 
It is possible that a strike called to enforce a legal claim does not fall 
within the scope of these two doctrines. Arbitration clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements of employers governed by the NLRA may be 
written either broadly or narrowly, so that some disputes may not be 
subject to arbitration. Moreover, requests for injunctive relief from 
strikes over arbitrable disputes may be denied for a variety of reasons. 109 
But as a practical matter, strikes to enforce legal rights appear to be 
relatively infrequent, no doubt due both to the availability of legal 
processes as an alternative means of enforcement, and to the fact that 
unsuccessful litigants generally are not liable for their opponent's legal 
fees. 
c. Solidarity Strikes and Secondary Action 
Strikes against a secondary employer (often referred to as a "secon-
dary boycott") in the situation described above in which Union U 
strikes or pickets Employer F to put pressure on it to stop doing 
business with Employer E, with whom the Union is seeking a collective 
107 See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982). Eight 
million dollars of damages were awarded. See Allied Int'I, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's 
Ass'n, 814 F.2d 32, 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1987). 
108 See infra text accompanying notes 219-22. 
I09For a discussion of the prerequisites for injunctive relief, see 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, 
supra note 33, at 981-93. 
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agreement, are generally illegal under NLRA section 8(b) (4) (B) (with 
an exception in section 8(e) for the apparel and clothing industry). 
The ban on secondary boycotts does not apply to railroad and airline 
unions governed by the RLA, but such union action is relatively infre-
quent. 110 
Due to the different structures and bargaining practices of American 
unions, as well as the omission in American law of the requirement 
that strikes be for the purpose of achieving a collective agreement, the 
situation described above as being only theoretically possible in Ger-
many, where Union X strikes Employer E in support of a strike by 
Union U, which is seeking a collective agreement with E, does arise in 
the United States. Such a strike is treated as a legal "sympathy" or 
"solidarity" strike. lll 
B. Relevance oj Timing and Form oj Strike 
A strike for a legal purpose may still be rendered illegal III each 
country by virtue of its timing and form. 
1. Germany 
a. Partia~ Intermittent, and Sit-Down Strikes 
The Federal Labor Court has held that partial strikes of all kinds, 
like go-slow and work-to-rule strikes, in which employees report for 
work but perform less efficiently, are illegal because the employees 
attempt to exercise their right to strike but nevertheless maintain their 
claim to be paid during the strike. This is considered to be "contrary 
to good morals" and, therefore, illegal under section 138 of the Ger-
man Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch).1!2 However, some commenta-
110 See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 
429 (1987). 
111 The best known example of a sympathy strike, Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 
U.S. 597 (1976), involved employees in separate bargaining units, represented by different locals 
of the same union. The local representing office and technical workers ("O&T") struck, and 
members of the local representing the production and maintenance workers ("P&M") refused 
to cross the O&T picket line. The Supreme Court held that although the parties agreed that their 
dispute over whether the P&M local's collective agreement prohibited sympathy strikes was an 
arbitrable dispute, the exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act that permits strikes over arbitrable 
disputes to be enjoined did not apply. For a discussion of this exception, see infra text accompa-
nying note 219. For a discussion of the treatment of sympathy strikes as being, in effect, an 
"exception to the exception" to the general ban on injunctions in labor disputes, see 2 DEVEL-
OPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 993-95. 
112 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 61 au Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (Federal Labor Court); 
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tors believe that if an employee has the right to refuse to work at all, 
then he or she should also have the right to refuse to work in part, 
and that the union should be able to choose which kind of strike it 
prefers. 1l3 It is difficult to reconcile this view with a requirement that 
the partial strikers be paid their full wages, as many employees might 
find attractive an option to work at only a tenth of their usual speed 
while being paid at their regular rate. Moreover, it would seem to be 
incompatible with the employer's right to govern the work place, 
although admittedly the powers of works councils make that right more 
qualified in Germany than in the United States. l14 
Both German courts and most commentators consider sit-down 
strikes, in which employees occupy the employer's premises but per-
form no work, to be illegal. ll5 This conclusion rests mainly on the fact 
that the employer as owner of the establishment need not allow some-
one to enter it if he does not intend to fulfill his duties under the 
employment contract, but, as is usually the case, seeks instead to pre-
vent other employees from working and using the work place. Inter-
mittent strikes, in which employees strike for a few hours or days and 
then return to work, are more problematic than sit-down strikes.1I6 
Though there has been some uncertainty in the past, today, intermit-
tent strikes generally are regarded as legal and have become quite 
common. Indeed, an intermittent strike can be viewed as merely an 
expanded version of a "warning" strike, differing only in that the 
warning is repeated. However, the Federal Labor Court recently held 
that if the employer cannot use the employees' services when they offer 
to return because it is afraid of further strikes or anticipates that 
another short strike will occur soon, the employer can refuse their 
offer to return to work and is under no duty to pay them during the 
time they are not working. 1l7 The employer can also hire a temporary 
replacement until the union calls a halt to the intermittent strike. 
Hansjorg Otto, in OTFRIED WLOTZKE & REINHARD RICHARDI, MU'NCHNER HANDBUCH ZUM AR-
BEITSRECHT § 279, § 58 (1992). 
113 See L6wISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 125. 
114 See Bertriebsverfassungsgesetz v. 1972 BGBl.I S.13; see also HALBACH ET AL., supra note 5, 
at 343 fI. 
115 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 59 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1978) (Federal Labor Court); 
LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 142; SEITER, supra note 70, at 143; DAUBLER ET AL., supra note 
96, at 345 (favoring legality under the circumstances). 
116 See Volker Rieble, 1997 SAMMLUNG ARBEITSRECHTLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 286 (for exam-
ples and references); Entscheidungssammlung zum Arbeitsrecht Nr. 37 zu Art. 9 GG (1980) 
(Federal Labor Court). 
117 1997 Sammlung Arbeitsrechtlicher Entscheidungen 281 ff (Federal Labor Court). 
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b. Strikes that Injure the Employer's Property 
A full understanding of the restrictions on the right to strike to avoid 
injury to the employer's property depends on an appreciation of the 
principle of commensurability, which is a cornerstone of the law gov-
erning strikes in Germany. The German Constitution, like the Ameri-
can Bill of Rights, protects from federal or state action the right to life, 
freedom of expression and press, and freedom of religion. liS A corol-
lary to this protection is that every restraint that limits a constitutionally 
protected right must be in furtherance of a legitimate goal. Thus, a 
statute limiting a constitutionally protected right of citizens must be 
appropriate and necessary to achieve its purpose, and the restraint of 
the constitutional right must be proportional, or commensurate, to the 
benefits that the statute can achieve.1l9 
This principle of commensurability was applied to the law of indus-
trial action by some early decisions of the Federal Labor Court. In a 
decision by the Grand Panel,120 the court stated: 
In our interwoven and mutually dependent society, strikes 
and lockouts often have a substantial impact not only on the 
persons directly involved in the industrial action, but also on 
non-strikers and other third parties as well as the public at 
large. Industrial actions must therefore be governed by the 
rule of commensurability. In this connection the economic 
facts are to be considered and the public welfare must not be 
obviously offended.121 
The court said further that the principle of commensurability con-
cerns: 
not only the moment when the strike starts and its goal, but 
also the manner in which it is carried out and the intensity 
of the industrial action. Thus, [it] is only lawful, if [the union] 
118 See GG Art. 2 (Right to Life); Art. 5, §§ 1, 2 (Freedom of Expression, Press); Art. 4, §§ 1,2 
(Freedom of Religion). 
119 See H. GoERLICH, Fundamental Constitutiunal Rights: Content, Meaning and General Doctrines, 
in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 45 (Ulrich Karpen, ed. 1988); 
ECKEHARD STEIN, STAATSRECHT 180 ff (13th ed. 1991). 
120 The Grand Panel decides only the very rare cases that either raise a question of fundamental 
importance or the view of one senate concerning a distinct problem differs from that of another 
panel. See Labor Court Act, § 45. 
121Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Number 43 zu Art. 9 GG: Arbeitskampf (April 21,1971) (Federal 
Labor Court GroBer Senat) , referring inter alia to Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Number 13 concerning 
Art. 9 GG (Federal Labor Court). 
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follows the rules of a fair fight. The industrial action cannot 
have as its goal to destroy the other side, but must have as its 
goal to restore the disturbed peaceful labor relations. . . . 
When the means of production are damaged because of the 
strike, ... then the work cannot resume after the strike at the 
point it stopped before the strike.122 
Preventing such damage is the purpose of emergency work (Notdi-
enstarbeiten) , which is work required to maintain the means of produc-
tion in the condition they were in before the industrial action.123 An 
example the court gave of a case in which such work may be required 
is where a blast furnace or a distinct chemical process must be contin-
ued to avoid damages to the plant. Other examples include work that 
is necessary to protect the public from dangers arising from the firm 
(e.g. a chemical fabric that might pollute the environme.nt danger-
ously) and work that is absolutely essential to prevent the employer 
from incurring utterly disproportionate damage.124 It is the common 
view that a strike is illegal if its aim is to ruin the employer and leads 
to the closing of the plant.125 The commentators disagree, however, 
over whether the mere fact that the strike might lead to this result is 
sufficient to make the strike illegal. 126 
The duty to insure that maintenance and other emergency work is 
carried on during a strike127 requires that the union and the employer 
agree on the details of such work. If the parties try to do so but are 
unable to reach an agreement in the matter, it is unclear whether the 
employer has the right to fix such details unilaterally or whether the 
employer must seek an interim injunction in the labor courts.128 
I22Id. 
123 See id. at 2139. 
124 See HALBACH ET AL., supra note 5, at 334. Concerning the impact of this principle on the 
interests of third parties and the public, see text accompanying notes 16S-72. 
125 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 43 zu Art 9 GG Arbeitskampf (Federal Labor Court); SEITER, 
supra note 23, at 532; Otto, supra note 112, at 110 §§ 278, 154. 
126 Pru. KOhler, 1987 RECHT DER ARBEIT 234, 239; Bernd Riithers, 1987 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
ARBEITSRECHT 1, 42-43; cuntra: LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 119. 
I27The draft bill proposed by the professors' group in 1988 included in § 11 such a duty. It has 
also been recognized, with respect to damage to products, by the Austrian Supreme Court in the 
"Banana Case." See Osterreichischejuristenzeitschrift 518 (May 1963). 
I28For details, see Entscheidungssammlung zum Arbeitsrecht Nr. 119 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeit-
skampf (Federal Labor Court) with a comment by Gregor Thiising; see also LOWISCH ET AL., supra 
note 89, at 237 (for references). 
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2. United States 
With statutory and common law sources of the right to strike, rather 
than constitutional sources, American law, with respect to the legality 
of different kinds of strikes, differs sharply from German law. In other 
contexts, American law is less solicitous of workers' interests. In con-
nection with strikes, the NLRA reflects far less concern for adverse 
effects on other partie~ither employers or the public, although 
substantial concern for the public impact of strikes is reflected in the 
emphasis under the RIA in avoiding interruptions of commerce.129 
Moreover, unlike the German Federal Labor Court, the United States 
Supreme Court has expressly denied the NLRB the power to function 
"as an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in 
seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands. "130 At the 
same time, particular employer tactics have been denounced as being 
inherently destructive of collective bargaining. 131 
a. Partia~ Intermittent, and Sit-Down Strikes 
Partial, intermittent,132 and sit-down strikes133 are not protected con-
certed activity under the NLRA, and an employer may respond to them 
with discipline or discharge of the employees involved without thereby 
committing an unfair labor practice. What may not be clear in some 
cases is whether the conduct in question comes within the definition 
of the term. Thus a sit-down strike, in which the strikers cease work 
but do not leave the employer'S premises, is generally unprotected, but 
a 25-minute in-plant protest has been held to be protected,134 as were 
employees who remained in the plant for several hours in the hope of 
discussing grievances, without interfering with other employees.135 
Partial strikes, in which employees remain at work but slow down 
production or refuse to perform certain tasks or to work overtime, is 
unprotected concerted activity. The same is true under the NLRA as 
to "intermittent" strikes, in which employees engage in a coordinated 
series of strikes. In the former type of strike, employees are seeking the 
129 See infra text accompanying notes 207--{)8. 
1!IONLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'!. Union, 361 U.s. 477, 497 (1960) 
151 See supra text accompanying note 87. 
1~2 See 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 1112-13. 
1M SeeNLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
1S4 See United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. NLRB, 554 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1977). 
135 See Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. NLRB, 882 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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benefits of employment but are ignoring the employer's directions as 
to how the job is to be done. In intermittent strikes, they seek to 
minimize lost wages and the risk of being replaced. However, the mere 
fact that employees have struck more than once does not automatically 
make their activity intermittent and unprotected. UI6 
Surprisingly, there is some judicial support for the view that inter-
mittent strikes are legal under the RLA. In Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., v. Teamsters, the Second Circuit held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act precluded an injunction against the union after it had 
engaged in a series of short walkouts and demonstrations, finding 
nothing in the RLA to prohibit such action. I37 Additionally, in Associa-
tion of Flight Attendants v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., the court refused to find 
that participants in the union's highly successful "Operation CHAOS" 
were engaging in unprotected activity so as to be subject to discharge. I!18 
Alaska Airlines illustrates the potentially devastating consequences of 
intermittent strikes for employers subject to the RLA. In order to cause 
maximum disruption to the airline's operations while minimizing wage 
losses for employees, the union used "rolling strike" tactics, in which 
strikers would offer to return to work after an hour or two. This 
technique took advantage of holdings in the Courts of Appeals that 
although an employer subject to the RLA may, like employers governed 
by the NLRA, permanently replace economic strikers,I39 a striker has 
not been replaced until the replacement has completed training and 
actually begins work. I40 Thus even if the airline were able to replace 
employees who struck on Day 1 during the brief period they left their 
jobs, another group would strike on Day 2 so that there would be 
vacancies to be filled when the Day 1 strikers sought reinstatement.141 
I!l6Thus in Westpac Electric, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B 1322 (1996), employees who struck three times 
in one month were protected by the Act, where each strike had its own separate motivating factors 
and were not all part of a single plan. 
137 See 894 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1990). For a criticism of the decision, see John J. Gallagher & 
Margaret H. Spurlin, Chaos: Partial and Intermittent Strikes under the RLA, SA31 A.L.I.-ABA. 559 
(1996). 
138 See 847 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Wash. 1993). 
l39 See Trans World Airlines V. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989). 
For a discussion of the permanent replacement doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 
202-04. 
140 See THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, supra note 54, at 322. 
141 See Gallagher & Spurlin, supra note 137, at 504. 
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b. Strikes that Injure the Employer's Property 
American law does not impose an obligation on a union to maintain 
the employer's property during a strike, but a few cases have held a 
strike to be unprotected because of the damage to the employer'S 
property that its timing caused. 142 For example, in NLRB v. Marshall 
Car Wheel & Foundry Co., the 5th Circuit held that an unannounced 
strike was unprotected when prolonged retention of molten iron in a 
cupola could cause costly damage to equipment. 143 A frequently liti-
gated issue concerns whether misconduct by strikers, including acts of 
sabotage, is sufficiently serious as to justifY their discharge.144 
C. Required Pre-Strike Procedures 
Required pre-strike procedures may serve anyone or more of several 
important purposes. Notice to the employer, coupled with an oppor-
tunity to bargain, may enhance the likelihood of achieving a collective 
agreement without imposing the economic burdens of a strike on all 
concerned. In addition, notice gives an employer a chance to prepare 
to follow alternative courses of action in case of a strike, either by 
continuing operations with other employees or replacement workers 
or by preparing to close the plant temporarily in such a way as to avoid 
physical injury or disruption of services to customers. Just as notice to 
the employer may facilitate achieving a collective agreement, a strike 
vote may also help the parties avoid a strike. A strike vote may provide 
a more accurate measure of employees' sentiments and allow them to 
express a preference for accepting the employer'S offer over striking. 
Even if a majority votes to strike, the size of the margin may be useful 
as an indication to both the union negotiators and the employer of 
the degree of dissatisfaction with its last offer. 
142 See, e.g, NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955). 
143 See id. 
144 See, e.g., Can-Tex Indus. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1183 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding discharge of 
employees who turned off continuously running machines in order to shut down plant and bring 
grievances to employer's attention to be unprotected). But see NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 
(1st Cir. 1954) (holding that the NLRB has the power to order reinstatement of strikers who had 
been discharged for unprotected activity, including, in some cases, mass picketing and acts of 
violence and destruction of property, in view of the fact that the strike had resulted from "flagrant" 
unfair labor practices of the employer). For a discussion of the subsequent history of the Thayer 
doctrine, see COX ET AL., supra note 91, at 565-67. The authors conclude that the NLRB has, in 
Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044 (1984), enfarced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), returned to 
its earlier view that it may not order reinstatement of unfair labor practice strikers who engage 
in violence or other unprotected activity. 
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1. Germany 
Required pre-strike procedures in Germany are not fully defined 
and may involve the union's informing the employer (or employer's 
association) what it seeks to achieve in collective bargaining and con-
sequently giving the employer an opportunity to negotiate with the 
union. Pre-strike procedures may also require obtaining majority sup-
port for the strike in a vote by union members. 
a. Giving Employers an opportunity to Negotiate 
It is clear that a union, before calling a full-fledged strike, must give 
the employer an opportunity to negotiate. What is less clear is the 
scope and extent of the right to call a short strike while negotiations 
are taking place in order to warn the employer of the union's willing-
ness to call a full-fledged strike if negotiations break down. For many 
years, the legality of warning strikes while negotiations were taking 
place was unclear despite the principle of commensurability discussed 
above,145 or whether such a strike is allowed only after the union has 
declared that negotiations have broken down.146 Since the "3rd Wam-
streik-Entscheidung' in 1988,147 however, it has been clear that no such 
formal declaration is required before calling a warning strike. Such a 
strike is, by its nature, merely intended to emphasize the seriousness 
of the union's demands and its willingness to strike in order to secure 
them and normally is of very brief duration-hours or days, rather 
than weeks or months. However, the Federal Labor Court has not 
placed any time limit on the duration of warning strikes. Apparently 
the union can decide for itself, within reasonable limits, how much 
pressure is necessary to demonstrate the seriousness of its willingness 
to call a full-fledged strike. 
b. Strike Votes 
Most unions' by-laws require a strike vote, but whether the failure to 
satisfy the requirement would render a strike illegal has not been 
decided by the courts, and commentators are divided on the question. 
145 See supra text accompanying notes 120--24. 
146 For a thoughtful analysis of this question, see HARALD PETERS, DIE ERXLARUNG DES SCHEIT-
ERNS DER VERHANDLUNGEN ALS VORAUSSETZUNG ElNES STRElKS (1996). See also HALBACH ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 333. 
147 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 108 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (Federal Labor Court). 
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In the absence of such a by-law, the prevailing view, both in judicial 
opinions and from commentators, is that no such vote is required. l48 
This conclusion is based on the view that requiring a strike vote does 
not reduce the likelihood of a strike and that the decision of a union 
board to call a strike is legitimated because board members are elected 
by union members in a democratic process. Some commentators who 
are of the contrary view argue that only when a majority of union 
members believe· that a strike is necessary to improve their working 
conditions is it really ultima ratio.149 Others argue that the requirement 
of a democratic structure for unions, which is recognized by the courts, 
requires that the members, rather than the board, decide whether to 
strike.150 
2. United States 
The NLRA generally does not require either unions or employees 
not represented by a union (who also have the right to strike) to give 
employers an opportunity to negotiate before a strike is called.151 How-
ever, unions are under a general duty to bargain in good faith 152 and 
are specifically required to offer to do S0153 after giving notice to the 
employer and to government agencies, before terminating or modifY-
ing a collective bargaining agreement. 154 Strike votes are required un-
der the LMRA only as part of a Presidentially-initiated procedure to 
deal with national emergency disputes.155 
In contrast to the NLRA, the RLA mandates compliance with "almost 
interminable" procedures before either unions or employers are enti-
148 See LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 29 (concerning only the strike vote requirement for 
Warnstreik Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 51, zu Art 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1976) (Federal Court». 
149 See Martin Vorderwiilbecke, 1987 BETRIEBSBERATER 750, 755. 
150 See 11/2 ALFRED HUECK ET AL., ARBEITSRECHT 1026 (7th ed. 1970). 
151 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
152 See NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1998). 
mSeeNLRA § 8(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (1998). 
154 See NLRA § 8(d)(I), (3),29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(I), (3). Strikes are prohibited during the 
required period of notice, 60 days or until the expiration of the collective agreement, whichever 
is later. See id. § 8(d) (4). In the case of a health care institution, defined in NLRA § 2(14), the 
period of notice is 90 days. See id. § 8(d) (A). Thirty days' notice of a dispute in bargaining for 
an initial agreement for employees of a health care institution must be given to the agencies 
described in NLRA § 8(d)(3). 
155 See generaUy LMRA §§ 206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1998). The provision for strike votes 
is in § 209(b) , 29 U.S.C. § 179(b). Section 212, at 29 U.S.C. § 182, makes these provisions 
inapplicable to matters subject to the RIA. 
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tied to use self-help in a dispute over wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment. 156 
a. Giving the Employer an opportunity to Negotiate; Notice 
Although there is no explicit requirement that an opportunity for 
the employer to negotiate precede a strike unless the union is seeking 
to terminate or modifY an existing collective agreement, providing 
such an opportunity to meet the union's demands would seem to be 
an implicit aspect of the duty to bargain in good faith. Of course, 
unorganized workers are subject to no such bargaining obligation 
because they are not subject to the NLRA. 
If a union plans to strike a health care institution, however, it must, 
in addition to the requirements described above, give the institution 
at least ten days' notice, stating the date and time the strike will 
commence.157 The notice requirement applies only to unions, and not 
to unorganized employees who engage in a concerted work stoppage. 
Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement with such an institu-
tion, the notice cannot be given until after the period specified for 
notice to government agencies has expired. 
b. Strike Votes 
Under the LMRA, strike votes are required only in connection with 
procedures to deal with strikes that, in the opinion of the President, 
"will, if permitted to occur or continue, imperil the national health or 
safety .... "158 A union's internal rules often require a strike vote, but 
the failure to comply with such rules would not make the strike illegal 
from the standpoint of the employer. Indeed, for the employer to insist 
on such a requirement in negotiating a collective bargaining agree-
ment is an unfair labor practice, as it is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining .159 
156 See infra text accompanying notes 160-64. 
157 SeeNLRA § 8(g), 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1998). 
15SLMRA § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1998); see also supra note 157. 
159 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). The bargaining 
obligations of both unions and employers are limited byNLRA § 8(d) to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, the so-called mandatory subjects, and insistence on a 
permissive (or illegal) subject is a violation of the duty to bargain in good faith. For an extensive 
exploration of the respective definitions of mandatory and permissive subjects, see 1 DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAw, supra note 85, at 854-63. 
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c. Pre-Strike Procedures Under the RLA 
The "almost interminable" character of pre-strike procedures under 
the RLA stems chiefly from the statutory role of the NMB. The RLA 
prohibits strikes over disputes about contract interpretation, which it 
characterizes as "minor disputes" and requires to be settled by arbitra-
tion. loo However, disagreements over contractual changes that would 
affect wages, rules, or working conditions are considered "major dis-
putes. "161 Accordingly, both employers and unions must give thirty days 
written notice of such intended changes,162 and either party may invoke 
the services of the Board. The Board may proffer its services if it finds 
any labor emergency to exist.16~ Once its services have been invoked 
or proffered, the parties are said to be "in mediation," and may not 
use "self help" until they are released from mediation by the Board. l64 
Prior to such a release, the carrier may not make the changes just 
described and the union may not strike. l65 If a dispute is not resolved 
by mediation or other procedures provided in the Act and, in the 
judgment of the Board, threatens "substantially to interrupt interstate 
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of 
essential transportation services," the Board must notifY the Presi-
dent. l66 The President has discretion to appoint a board to investigate 
and report on the dispute. Appointment of such a board, which must 
report within thirty days, extends the no-strike period until 30 days 
after it makes its report.167 
160RLA § 2, Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth (1998), provides for arbitration of such disputes and 
had been held to bar strikes over such disputes. See, e.g., Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & 
I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). For cases reaching the same result for the airline industry under a 
different provision of the Act, see THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, supra note 54, at 291 n.185. 
161 SeeRLA § 2, Sixth, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth. 
162 See id. § 6, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1998). 
Iii! See id. at § 5, First, 45 U.S.C. § 155, First (1998). 
164Technically, the release from mediation is the result of a two-step process. Mter the Board 
determines that its efforts to settle the dispute through mediation have been unsuccessful, its 
final required action is to seek to induce the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration, and 
if either or both refuse, for 30 days the carrier generally cannot change rates of pay, rules, or 
working conditions or established practices. See id. For a detailed description ofNMB mediation 
procedures, see THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, supra note 54, at 213-19. 
165The ban on changes by the carrier, commonly referred to as an obligation to maintain the 
status quo, is explicit in RLA § 5 First and § 6. For a discussion, see THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, 
supra note 54, at 231-39. The corollary status quo obligation of unions rests on judicial construc-
tion. See id. at 246-50. 
166RLA § 10,45 U.S.C. § 160 (1998). 
167 See id. 
62 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No. 1 
D. Limitations on the Right to Strike to Protect the Interests of the Public 
A recurring dilemma in labor law is how to reconcile the use of 
strikes by employees to obtain justified improvements in the terms and 
conditions of their employment with the hardships for third parties 
that such activities may cause. Obviously, some strikes may continue for 
a prolonged period without causing significant hardship to very many 
third parties. A classic example would be a strike by employees of a gas 
station in an area where there are many others nearby. In contrast, a 
strike by the employees of the local power company, if it causes a 
suspension of electric service, would have a substantial and immediate 
impact. In this situation, German law generally is far more protective 
of the interests of third parties than is American law. 
1. Germany 
The principle of commensurability limits the right to strike not only 
in regard to the interests of the employer, but also in regard to the 
legitimate interests of society and requires that the elementary needs 
of the public must continue to be fulfilled during the strike. This is 
the common view of the Federal Labor Courtl68 and almost every 
German commentator.169 Hospitals, as well as establishments providing 
energy or water, garbage disposal, funeral services, the mail or similar 
work, must always provide a minimum service. 170 For example, during 
a strike at a hospital, urgent operations must be performed, but not 
those that can wait without danger to the health of the patient. l7l 
Unions normally accept this necessary minimum work, and the um-
brella organization DGB explicitly mentions observance of this duty in 
168 See 1982 Der Betrieb 2139 f (Federal Labor Court); Entscheidungssammlung zum Ar-
beitsrecht Nr. 119 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1995) (Federal Labor Court). 
169 See WWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 122-23; Wolfgang Riifner, Zur Gemeinwohlbindung tier 
Tarifuert.ragsparteien, RECHT DER ARBEIT 193 (1985); HORTMUT OETKER, DIE DURCHFUHRUNG 
VON NOT-UND ERHALTUNGSARBElTEN BEl ARBEITSKAMPFEN 38 ff (1984). 
170 Section 12 of the draft Industrial Action Act by the German labor law professors describes 
these areas of important public service as, "the areas to fulfill the fundamental personal, social, 
and state needs" and includes, in addition to those listed above, telephone, IV, radio, firemen, 
security and defense (although strikes by policemen and soldiers are illegal anyway because they 
are public servants similar to "Beamte"). See ROLF BIRK ET AL., GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG KoLLEK-
TIVER ARBEITSKONFLIKTE 6 (1988). 
171 See DAUBLER ET AL., supra note 96, at 366. 
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its rules for industrial action, which are binding on all of its member 
unions.172 
2. United States 
Apart from the provisions described above which serve to delay, 
rather than to limit, the· scope of strikes, neither the NLRA nor the 
RIA includes any provision for commensurability similar to that re-
flected in German law in limitations on the right to strike in order to 
protect either the employer or the public interest. Thus, it is theoreti-
cally possible for a strike by the steel workers to shut down steel 
production for an indefinite period or a strike by the railroad or airline 
unions to shut down the operation of a railroad or an airline. As a 
practical matter, however, industry-wide shut-downs of employers sub-
ject to the NLRA have been rare, and Presidential intervention, author-
ized by the LMRA, has been infrequent. Disputes between unions and 
railroads or airlines have been more frequent targets of the exercise 
of Presidential emergency powers under the RIA, the most recent 
being President Clinton's action in August, 1997 to avert a strike by 
Amtrak employees. 
a. Under the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA) 
The President's power under section 206 of the Act in relation to 
certain strikes and lock-outs that he believes ''will, if permitted to occur 
or to continue, imperil the national health or safety," is limited to 
appointment of "a board of inquiry to inquire into the issues involved 
in the dispute and to make a written report to him .... "173 The report 
"shall not contain any recommendations."174 The President is required 
to "make its contents available to the public."175 The President may, 
upon receiving the report, direct the Attorney General to seek to 
enjoin the strike or lock-out, and the district court, if it makes the 
requisite findings as to the national health and safety, may grant an 
injunction.176 However, its term is limited to a maximum of eighty 
days. 177 
172 See Arbeitskampfrichtlinien des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes vom 5.5.1974, reprinted in 
1974 Recht der Arbeit 306 f. 
173LMRA § 206, 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1998). 
174Id. 
175Id. 
176 See id. § 208(a), 29 U.S.C. § 178(a). 
177 See id. § 209(b), 29 U.S.C. § 179(b) (mandating procedures within periods adding up to 80 
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While the injunction is in force, the board must make a further 
report to the President, including a statement of the employer's last 
offer, which is then submitted by the NLRB to a secret-ballot vote by 
the employees of each employer involved in the dispute.178 Upon cer-
tification of the results or the earlier settlement of the dispute, the 
injunction will be discharged.179 Thus, the President's power does not 
include the right to impose terms on the parties. However, the provi-
sions for postponement, during which time the impact of his views, the 
boards' report, the employees' vote, and the force of public opinion, 
may in combination create strong pressures for settlement. 
Between 1947 and 1978, the President invoked the emergency in-
junction procedures approximately thirty times. ISO The last such invo-
cation appears to have been by President Carter in March, 1978, after 
the labor dispute between the United Mine Workers and the Bitumi-
nous Coal Operations had continued for 102 days.181 The court issued 
a temporary restraining order, which the miners generally disregarded. 
However, the district court declined to renew the injunction, finding 
insufficient "evidence of irreparable harm to the national health or 
safety," and the strike ended after 110 days.182 Since 1978, however, 
although there have been some long-running strikes in industries 
subject to the emergency provisions of the LMRA,183 there has been 
little occasion to invoke emergency procedures to deal with them. In 
an era of down-sizing and globalization, union militancy has been 
relatively low. 
b. Under the RLA 
Presidential use of emergency boards has been far more extensive 
under the RLA than under the NLRA, no doubt reflecting the greater 
days). In common parlance, when the President invokes these procedures he is said to have 
sought an "80 day injunction." 
I78LMRA § 209(b), 29 U.S.C. § 179(b) (1998). 
179 See id. § 210, 29 U.S.C. § 1BO. 
ISO See Peter B. Shipman, The Scope of the National Emergency Labor Injunctiun Law, 9 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 709, 710 (1978). For references to critical comments on the emergency dispute 
procedures, see Leo Kanowitz, American Labor Law and the United States Space Shuttle, 34 
HASTINGS LJ. 715, 732 n.88 (1983). 
181 See Coal Strike Ends un 110th Day After Miners Approve Agreement; 57% Vote for Pact, FACTS 
ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, March 31,1978, at 217 AI. 
IB2U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3176 (D.D.C. Mar. 9 & 17,1978). 
183 A well-known illustration is the recently settled 6-year strike against Caterpillar Tractor. See 
157 LAB. REL. REp. (BNA) 379 (Mar. 30, 1998). 
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public unwillingness to tolerate interruption of transportation services, 
for which there often is no convenient substitute. Through 1997, emer-
gency boards have been appointed in 200 railroad disputes and 34 
airline disputes. l84 Apart from the 1997 Amtrak dispute referred to 
above, the most recent request for an emergency board was the Airline 
Pilots Association dispute with American Airlines in February, 1997, 
but the strike effectively ended as soon as the President called for the 
board. I85 Prior thereto, the last airline emergency board was appointed 
in 1966 by President Johnson in a dispute involving the International 
Association of Machinists, but the strike nevertheless took place. 
As with the emergency procedures under the LMRA, the emergency 
procedures under the RIA do no more than provide for fact-finding 
and delay. However, Congress has intervened seventeen times in rail-
road disputes through 1994, either to continue emergency board fact-
finding, to require the parties to submit to binding arbitration, or to 
accept the board's recommendations. I86 
From the perspective of preventing and limiting the severity of work 
stoppages, the RIA's emergency dispute procedures have been highly 
effective. The Act as a whole enjoys strong support from both unions 
and management, although that may stem from a preference on each 
side for the status quo, with all of its faults, over the risks of the 
unknown.I87 Indeed, in many respects, the Act protects the status quo 
to a far greater extent than the more dynamically-oriented NLRA, 
making it more difficult to change either the identity of the bargaining 
representative or the terms of the collective agreement, or for either 
side to resort to self-help in a labor dispute. I88 Whether, on balance, 
these consequences are viewed positively, and whether they have led 
to unreasonably high wage costs and continuation of restrictive work 
rules, is outside the scope of this article. I89 
184 SeeJoshua M.Javits, Emergency Board Procedures under Sections 9A and 10 of the Railway Labor 
Act, SC25 A.L.I.-A.BA. 377, 381 (1997). 
185 See id. at 382. 
186 See id. at 390. 
187 See Leave RLA Alone, Say Carriers, Labor, u.s. RAIL NEWS, vol. 16, No. 19 (Sept. 17, 1993), 
available in 1993 WL 2916462. 
188Commentators have characterized the RIA as ''interventionist" in dispute resolution and 
"abstentionist" in other areas. See Dennis Arouca & Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Transportation Labor 
Regulation: Is the Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act the Better Statutory Vehicle' 
1985 LABOR L.J. 145, 146. 
189 For a discussion, see FRANK N. WILNER, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT & THE DILEMMA OF LABOR 
RELATIONS 63-71 (1991). 
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III. LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO A LEGAL STRIKE 
Possible employer responses to a legal strike may include continuing 
to operate with non-striking personnel, providing additional compen-
sation for work done during a strike, replacing strikers, and locking 
out other employees. 
A. Germany 
An employer'S responses to a legal strike are severely limited by the 
principle of commensurability and the view that the strike merely 
suspends and does not terminate the worker's employment contract. 
On the other hand, employers are allowed to pay additional compen-
sation for work performed during a strike, over and above that which 
was provided in the last offer made to the union before the strike 
began. 
1. Lockouts 
In Germany, lockouts are relatively rare. However, they are the prin-
cipal means with which the employer can respond to a strike. This use 
of the lockout, as well as the strike itself, must follow the principle of 
commensurability. In the 1980's, the Federal Labor Court developed 
from this principle some limits on the number of employees that can 
be affected by this measure. 190 These are highly criticized by most 
commentators,191 but have not yet been overruled. If the union calls 
for a strike of 25% or less of the employer's work force, the employer 
can legally lock out another 25%. If the union calls out more than 25% 
but less than 50%, the employer can lock out enough of the work force 
to bring the percentage up to 50%. If 50% or more of employees strike, 
the employer lacks the right to lock out, because the right can only be 
exercised in an "unfair" strike, where the union seeks to disturb the 
entire enterprise with a partial strike of less than 50% of employees so 
as to limit wage loss and the cost of strike benefits. However, according 
to a recent decision of the Federal Labor Court, 192 later affirmed,193 the 
190 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 64 und 65 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1980) (Federal Labor 
Court). 
191 See, e.g. MANFRED LIEB, ARBEITSRECHT s. 87 (6th ed. 1997). 
192Federal Labor Court Entscheidungssammlung zum Arbeitsrecht Nr. 115 zu Art. 9 GG 
Arbeitskampf (1994). 
193 See Entscheidungssammlung zum Arbeitsrecht Nr. 119 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1995) 
(Federal Labor Court); 1995 Neue Zeitschrift fUr Arbeitsrecht 209 (1995) (Federal Labor Court). 
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employer may close the entire enterprise for the time of the strike, 
even though only part of the work force is on strike. The Court did 
not consider this a lockout; instead, the court found that such an 
employer merely refuses to take measures against the pressure of the 
union. Many commentators, who do not see a difference between 
locking out the entire work force of a plant and closing a plant, have 
criticized this decision. 194 
2. Additional Wages for Work During a Strike 
A rather common means an employer may use to influence the strike 
and the employee's willingness to strike is offering additional wages to 
employees who continue to work during the strike. The extent to which 
such wages are legal and not prohibited as discriminatory against 
striking workers is unclear. The main view of the courts appears to be 
that additional wages are allowed when they compensate the working 
employees for more difficult work conditions experienced during the 
strike. When an employee earns more money than usual because he 
or she worked more than usual is not considered to be discrimina-
tion. 195 This is a common opinion.196 Moreover, according to the courts, 
additional wages are also allowed when they are announced during the 
strike as an incentive to dissuade workers from striking, and commen-
tators mostly agree.197 Finally, it is surely not allowed to pay and an-
nounce after the end of the strike additional wages for those who have 
worked during the strike, just because they worked during the strike. 
Such payments cannot influence the strike and thus cannot be justified 
by the employer's interest to influence the strike. Their only purpose 
is to punish the strikers because they took part in the strike. Thus, even 
if the extra payments are minimal, they are prohibited as discrimina-
tory.19B 
194 See THUSING, supra note 10, at 126 n.444. 
195 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 123 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1992) (Federal Labor 
Court); see also L6wISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 208. 
196 See Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 127 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf (1993) (Federal Labor 
Court); L6wISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 141 (for further references). 
197 Some commentators, however, strongly disagree. See D.'\UBLER ET AL., supra note 96, § 280 
if. 
198In the famous decision of the Labor Court of Appeals of Cologne, this additional wage was 
a bottle of French champagne (worth about $20). The court decided that the employer must also 
give a bottle of champagne to the striking employees. See Landesarbeitsgerichtsentscheidungen 
Nr. 39 zu Art. 9 GG (1990). See also Arbeitsrechtliche Praxis Nr. 124 zu Art. 9 GG Arbeitskampf 
(1992) (Federal Labor Court). 
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B. United States 
In the United States, employers enjoy greater freedom to lock out 
striking employees and may permanently replace them during an eco-
nomic strike. Employers do not enjoy this right, however, in a strike 
caused or prolonged by the employer's unfair labor practices. More-
over, employers are not permitted to pay wages for work during the 
strike at a rate higher than that provided in its final offer to the union. 
1. Lockouts 
An American employer has far more leeway in locking out employ-
ees than its German counterpart. The Supreme Court has sustained 
the defensive use of lockouts in anticipation of a strike,199 and the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has held bargaining 
lockouts to be legal where the employer seeks to strengthen its position 
in ongoing negotiations with the union.2°O In the latter situation, the 
employer may go further and continue operation by employing tem-
porary replacements. 201 
2. Permanent Replacement of Economic Strikers 
As in Germany, the strike does not terminate the employment rela-
tionship. But according to language in a sixty year-old Supreme Court 
opinion, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telephone Co., the employer has the 
right to replace strikers permanently as long as the strike was neither 
caused nor prolonged by the employer's unfair labor practices.202 The 
permanently replaced striker has the right to reinstatement whenever 
there is a suitable vacancy if he or she makes an unqualified offer to 
return to work and has not obtained other substantially equivalent 
full-time employment.203 However, the employee has no right to dis-
place employees with less seniority who chose not to honor the strike 
or to return before it ends.204 
199 See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965). 
200 See International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
201 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 244-48 (1996) (describing an employer's 
options after an impasse has been reached in contract negotiations). For a discussion of offensive 
uses of lockouts, see 2 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 33, at 1146-55. 
202 See 304 U.S. 333 (1938). For a discussion, see David Westfall, Striker Replacements and 
EmpluyeeFreedom of Choice, 7 LAB. LAw. 137 (1991). 
203 See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1968). 
204 See Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 420 (1989). 
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3. Additional Wages for Work During a Strike; Changes in Terms 
and Conditions of Employment 
Employers subject to the NLRA are not permitted to pay wages 
higher than those offered in negotiations with strikers for labor per-
formed during a strike. Moreover, under the NLRA, an employer's duty 
to bargain with the union representing the employees continues dur-
ing a legal strike until the parties have bargained to "impasse," a term 
that is neither referred to in the Act nor susceptible of precise defini-
tion. Impasse is said to occur "after good-faith negotiations have ex-
hausted the prospects of concluding an agreement. "205 However, im-
passe on some issues does not suspend the obligation to bargain over 
other issues. Instead, the effect of reaching impasse is to suspend the 
duty to bargain with respect to the issues as to which an impasse exists, 
and, subject to the exceptions noted above,206 to permit the employer 
to make unilateral changes in working conditions, as long as such 
changes are not substantially different from, or greater than, offers 
made during negotiations. 
Under the RLA, the carrier's obligation as a common carrier to 
make all reasonable efforts to continue providing transportation serv-
ices during a strike permits it to go beyond unilaterally implementing 
the proposals that have been suggested via the procedures governing 
major disputes. Indeed, the carrier is permitted to modify existing 
agreements to the extent that such changes are "reasonably necessary 
to continue operations."207 These changes may even include paying 
replacement workers a higher wage than that established by relevant 
employment contracts applicable to regular employees.208 However, 
the standard of what changes are "reasonably necessary" is construed 
strictly, and the right to continue to implement any such changes ends 
with the end of the strike.209 
The Court distinguished its previous holding in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), 
that a promise of super-seniority to returning strikers and replacement workers hired during a 
strike is an unfair labor practice because of the chilling effect on exercise of the right to strike. 
205 Taft Broad., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478, 1m/arced on this point, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C.Cir. 1968); see 
alsoAtIas Tack Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 222, 227 (1976), 1m/arced, 559 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1977). 
206 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
207Empresa Ecuatoriana de Aviacion, S.A. v. District Lodge 100, 690 F.2d 838, 842 (11th Cir. 
1982). 
208 See Brotherhood of Ry. & Ss. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 248 n.8 (1966). 
209 [d. at 248. 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ILLEGAL STRIKE 
The consequences of an illegal strike are quite different in Germany 
than in the United States, especially as far as unions are concerned. 
A. Germany 
German law does not distinguish between an unprotected strike and 
an illegal strike. When a strike is within the scope as described above, 
it is legal, and if it does not fulfill all these requirements it is illegal; 
tertium non datur. If the strike is illegal, this has consequences for both 
unions and employees. As a rule, the employer can respond to a 
threatened illegal strike by going to court to get both a permanent 
and-usually more important-a preliminary injunction against the 
strike.210 This is the common view, and such injunctions have been so 
obtained with relative frequency.211 If an illegal strike actually occurred, 
the employer can sue the union for damages and-at least theoreti-
cally-sue all employees for the full amount, all of whom are jointly 
and severally liable.212 The damages can be based on both a tort the-
ory-against the union and the employees-and also on breach of 
contract-against the employees.213 The only prerequisite is that the 
union or the employee knew that the strike was illegal or could rea-
sonably have known it. If a union calls for a strike, it is presumed that 
the employee did not act negligently when he presumed the strike to 
be legal.214 However, this presumption is rebuttable, and the fact that 
the employee could be held liable for the whole amount of damages 
is highly criticized by many commentators because it might unduly 
threaten the employee's right to strike.215 Also, if the strike is illegal 
and the employee could have known this, he or she can be dismissed 
by the employer because the breach of contract may be an "important 
reason" under Article 626 of the Civil Code, which allows the immedi-
ate termination of the employment contract for "important reasons." 
210 See LOWISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 271-72; Udo Isenhard, Einstweiliger Rechtsschulz. im 
Arbeitskampj, in ARBEITSGESETZGEBUNG UND ARBEITSRECHTSPRECHUNG 201 ff. (1995). 
211 See 1997 Neue Zeitschrift fur Arbeitsrecht 800 (Labor Court of Appeals of Cologne). 
212 See L6wISCH ET AL., supra note 89, at 269. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. at 264. 
215 See DXUBLER ET AL., supra note 96, at 480-81. 
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B. United States 
As noted above, strikes may be illegal under American federal law 
because they violate either the terms of a statute or a provision of a 
collective agreement. In addition, strikes that do not involve such a 
violation may fall outside any statutory protection of concerted activi-
ties of employees. Because of the different histories of the RIA and 
NLRA, an employer has different remedies under each Act. 
1. National Labor Relations Act 
In addition to the remedies afforded employers in legal strikes, ad-
ditional remedies are available, including actions for damages against 
the union, injunctions in a limited class of cases, and discharge of 
striking employees. 
a. Damages 
Section 301 of the NLRA authorizes suits against unions for violation 
of collective agreements, and section 303 (b) authorizes suits by any 
party injured by a strike prohibited by section 8(b) (4), which includes 
secondary boycotts and other kinds of illegal strikes. Suits for damages 
for breach of contract against individual employees who leave their 
jobs, as part of a strike are relatively rare, since the employee may be 
judgment-proof, or the expense of litigation may exceed the expected 
recovery. Moreover, the prevailing cultural norm generally accords to 
employees the right to quit.216 Additionally, an employer's suing, or 
threatening to sue an individual employee constitutes an unfair labor 
practice under NLRA Section 8(a) (1) if the suit is not meritorious or 
the threat is in retaliation for the exercise of statutorily protected 
rights.217 
b. Injunctions 
Deep-seated suspicion of courts and hostility to judicial intervention 
in labor disputes led to the enactment in 1932 of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, which deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunc-
216 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ETAL., EMPLOYMENT LAw § 1.lO (1994). Of course the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution generally prohibits involuntary servitude, except for judicially 
implied exceptions for the armed forces and the merchant marine. See id. 
217 See 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 85, at 136. 
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tions restraining peaceful conduct in labor disputes.218 However, a 
judicially-created exception allows injunctions to be issued in appro-
priate cases against strikes over a matter subject to arbitration under 
the terms of a collective agreement, if the employer agrees to arbitrate 
the dispute. 219 The Act does not apply to state courts, which accordingly 
remain free to issue injunctions against strikes in breach of collective 
agreements, in the absence of a state "Little Norris-LaGuardia" Act.220 
2. ~ailway Labor Act 
Although enactment of the RLA preceded the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
by six years, the Supreme Court has held that the latter act does not 
bar injunctive relief against a party whose conduct violates an express 
prohibition in the RLA and an injunction is the only practical way to 
enforce the statute.221 Another exception to the general ban on injunc-
tions against peaceful conduct in labor disputes is parallel to the 
similar judicially-created exception under the NLRA, as it permits 
injunctions against strikes over "minor" disputes over the interpreta-
tion of collective agreements. 222 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion seeks to provide a clearer understanding 
of the similarities and differences between German treatment of strikes 
and lockouts and the treatment afforded by American law under the 
highly disparate provisions of the NLRA and the RLA, with only passing 
references to the federal and state limitations on strikes by public 
sector employees. A related question is what features of each system 
are attractive candidates that should be replicated elsewhere, always 
taking account of the interrelationships which may make it inappro-
priate to consider adoption of separate parts without others to which 
they are closely related. 
218 See supra note 9l. 
219 See Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For a discussion 
of the requirements for issuance of a so-called "Boys Markets" injunction, see 1 DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAw, supra note 85, at 981-1002. 
220 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1998). 
221 See, e.g., Burlington N.RR Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 
429 (1987); Chicago & N.W.R.R Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1971); see 
also The Railway Labor Act, supra note 54, at 243-45. 
222 See, e.g., Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.RC., 353 U.S. 30 
(1957); see also THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, supra note 54, at 290-92. 
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Both legal systems seek to protect third parties from undue burdens 
from strikes by private sector employees. However, both pursue this 
goal in sharply contrasting ways. In Germany, the relevant laws funda-
mentally seek to prohibit strikes for purposes other than collective 
bargaining and require that minimum services be maintained to meet 
the essential needs of the public. The United States has no similar 
limitation on the permissible purposes of strikes, although the ban on 
secondary action under the NLRA (but not under the RIA) bars a 
major category of strikes that does not seek to affect the labor policies 
of the struck employer. In addition, the right of an employer under 
the NLRA to replace economic strikers permanently is an important 
counterweight to the right of workers to strike for reasons other than 
collective bargaining-or indeed for no reason that is communicated 
to the employer-as well as serving to check unreasonable bargaining 
demands by unions. Instead of requiring minimum air and rail services 
to be maintained during a strike, American law relies on the almost 
interminable procedures required by the RIA before a strike is con-
sidered legal, the National Mediation Board's exercise of its powers 
under that act to avoid serious interruptions of services, and the 
backup of Presidential emergency powers to deal with disputes in those 
industries. Industries governed by the NLRA are also subject to such 
Presidential powers, if the criteria specified in the applicable statute 
are met. An additional safeguard to protect both employers and the 
public from unforeseen strikes is the requirement of notice for some, 
but not all, strikes under the NLRA. 
Maintenance of minimum services to meet the essential needs of the 
public during a strike appears to work well in Germany, in both private 
sector and public sector employment, but that may reflect in part the 
willingness of the DGB to require its constituent unions to act reason-
ably in keeping with the spirit of this requirement. It is uncertain 
whether the AFL-CIO would be willing and able to exercise compara-
ble influence over its unions, or how the Teamsters in particular would 
respond to such a requirement. 
If the United States adopted the German requirement that strikes 
be for the purpose of collective bargaining, sympathy strikes by union-
ized workers, strikes to protest unfair labor practices, and walkouts by 
unorganized employees would all become illegal. Such a sweeping 
curtailment of the right to strike does not seem justified, particularly 
in view of the potential ability of many employers to continue opera-
tions with supervisory personnel or temporary replacements. 
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A prohibition of partial and intermittent strikes is common to both 
German law and the NLRA. The problems created by lack of a similar 
clear prohibition under the RIA were well illustrated by the aptly-
named Operation CHAOS against Alaska Airlines,223 and the obvious 
remedy is to extend the prohibition to it as well. 
Notice is required of some, but not all, categories of strikes under 
the NLRA and may appear to be implicit in the almost interminable 
procedures required before a strike is legal under the RIA. Of course, 
there is no requirement that the exact time when the strike will occur 
be specified, leaving both employers and the public in a state of 
continuing uncertainty about when and to what extent to revise their 
plans. Still, a general provision in the NLRA for notice that a strike 
may occur is preferable to no notice at all. A similar requirement might 
be a useful addition to German law as well. 
American experience with a duty to bargain can serve to rebut the 
contentions of those who base their opposition to its recognition in 
Germany on the contention that the duty would become a duty to 
agree to the demands ofthe opposing party. Section 8(d) of the NLRA 
explicitly negates that view, and the courts generally have declined to 
review the substance of the parties' bargaining positions on the man-
datory subjects specified in that section: "wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment."224 
Similarly, Section 2, First of the RIA imposes a duty "to make every 
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates 
of pay, rules, and working conditions." The courts have generally 
assumed that duty to be at least as stringent as the bargaining obliga-
tion under the NLRA, but not to preclude a party's being adamant 
about its proposals225 or engaging in "robust, bare-knuckled bargain-
ing."226 Although some commentators have been skeptical about the 
practical effectiveness of the bargaining obligation, past experience 
shows that it clearly has a major impact in a large number of cases and 
thus may limit the need for unions to go on strike. An exploration of 
American experience in enforcing the obligation, though beyond the 
22~ See supra text accompanying notes 137-38. 
224 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 u.s. 99 (1970). But see NLRB v. A-I King Size 
Sandwiches, Inc. 732 F. 2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that "[tlhe Board correctly inferred bad 
faith from the Company's insistence on proposals that are so unusually harsh and unreasonable 
that they are predictably unworkable"). 
225 See, e.g. flight Attendants (IFFA) v. Trans World Airlines, 878 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1989). 
226 Trans Int'l Airlines v. Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949,958 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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scope of this article, might encourage the German courts to adopt a 
means that fits so well within the principle of ultima ratio. 
All these are only a few conclusions one might draw; many others 
could come to mind. Many more aspects might be considered in order 
to reach a deeper understanding. Comparison of legal systems is a long 
journey, the end of which might not be foreseeable at the start. How-
ever, each journey starts with a first step. Indeed, the foregoing sugges-
tions might serve as a first step toward further exploration of the 
possibility that each system might benefit ifit borrowed from the other, 
in the quest of each for fair treatment of employees, employers, and 
the entire community. It surely is worth taking it. 
